Derby City Council

CORPORATE SCRUTINY AND CLIMATE CHANGE BOARD
25 March 2013

ITEM 7

Report of the Strategic Director of Neighbourhoods

The Case for Trams in Derby

SUMMARY

1.1 There is a strong logical argument that as congestion on the roads increases, causing a range of associated social and environmental impacts, that a modern, reliable and fast mass public transit system is critical to maintaining the future vitality of the city and in providing equitable travel choices for its residents and visitors. In addition, there is also an argument that a high quality public transit system would support Derby's image as a high tech transport manufacturer.

1.2 However, the current case for a mass public transit system in Derby above and beyond a conventional bus system is not compelling. The construction costs of systems such as trams or trolleybuses for Derby would be unaffordable. For example, the average cost of a tram system in the UK has cost £285.4 million and the Leeds NGT trolleybus system will cost around £250.7 million. It is likely that with Central Government's devolvement of major scheme capital and the way that they are trying to remove the over-reliance on central public funding, these types of schemes will become more difficult and risky to fund in the future.

1.3 It is difficult to predict patronage forecasts without detailed appraisal and transport modelling demand forecasting. However, existing public transport demand and the potential mode transfer from car suggests that there is not the passenger demand to underpin the jump in both construction and operating costs for either a trolleybus or tram system in Derby.

1.4 An important issue to consider is that in order to maximise patronage capture for a tram or trolleybus system, it would require a much wider transport planning strategy to deliver. A new mass public transit would invariably compete with the bus network and this would have to be reorganised. The private car will be the major competitor to a tram network and would need to be restricted to ensure maximum patronage transfer. Indeed, Nottingham has introduced a work place parking levy to discourage commuter car trips and to help pay for their public transport system. Demand management, such as work place parking levies and congestion charging, is not part of the current long term transport strategy for Derby City.

RECOMMENDATION

2.1 To note the findings of this report and the extent to which the construction of a new tram or trolleybus system is currently not an affordable option for Derby. In addition, the current patronage demand for public transport is not of a sufficient level to justify such a significant step change in capacity or operation and maintenance costs.

REASONS FOR RECOMMENDATION

3.1 The report on long term transport options was requested by the board at their November 2012 meeting.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Introduction

4.1 This report briefly considers the case for trams in Derby and the wider question as to whether there is demand for a public mass transit system beyond the conventional bus. However, any form of fixed network public transport system comes at a significantly higher cost than conventional buses. Not least, because they require segregated routes and costly specialised infrastructure and vehicles that need on-going maintenance. As a result the patronage demand to sustain such systems also jumps in comparison.

The Case for Derby

4.2 The current long term transport strategy for Derby is contained in Derby's third Local Transport Plan (2011-2016). Local transport plans have been a statutory requirement for local transport authorities since their introduction in 2001. Trams were considered as part of the option development process for Derby in the preparation of LTP3 and the previous other two LTPs for the city.

4.3 However, because the capital construction costs are so high and the broad estimate of the potential patronage demand is not enough to sustain a tram system, the concept for Derby has never been taken any further.

4.4 There are a couple of specific studies that have been undertaken in support of the development of past LTPs. These studies considered alternative modes of transport to the bus including trams but also cheaper technology such as bus rapid transit and personal rapid transit. The Derby Public Transport Options Study (2000) carried out by WS Atkins, The Mickleover/Mackworth Express Busway Feasibility Study (2003) undertaken by Halcrow, and MVA's Derby Area Transport Strategy (2004) looked at specific solutions to providing some form of mass public transit system at specific locations in the city.

4.5 The conclusions reached in each of the studies were not particularly favourable for technology beyond conventional buses. Indeed, the conclusions drawn from the Atkin's study was that the 'break even' level of patronage for light rail systems is far in excess of likely travel demands that could arise in the Derby area. Atkins suggests that light rail is viable when peak passenger flows exceed around 2,000 passengers per hour per direction. The study also concluded that trolleybuses are considerably more expensive in capital cost, and similar in operational cost, to diesel buses thus the cost per passenger mile is increased and make the system

prohibitive. In general buses appear to be the most appropriate form of transport for Derby, based on the current public transport demand levels witnessed in the city. Indeed the bus network can still be enhanced to improve capacity and reliability through segregated lanes, bus priority at traffic signals, real time information and integrated bus ticketing.

4.6 More recently, the Derby Renaissance Board (DRB) asked Interfleet Technology to review the findings of the Local Transport plan 3 (LTP3) and supporting studies to determine if there are any viable options for the provision of a high-quality public transport system, over and above bus systems. This is an independent report that was prepared exclusively for the DRB and has not been released into the public domain. The findings of the report did not contradict the current Local Transport Plan or conclusions from past studies commissioned by Derby City Council.

Capital Costs of Light Rail Systems

4.7 The capital cost of constructing light rail systems, such as trams, are significantly more than conventional bus systems, due to the requirement for fixed tracks, the electric catenary, electrical substations, and other infrastructure that buses do not need. In addition, light rail lines need their own garages and stations for boarding and alighting. **Table 1** below summarises the capital construction costs of a number of tram systems from the UK.

System	Opening Date	Length (km)	Construction Cost at 2010/11 prices (£ Millions)	Construction Cost per km (£ Millions)	Population of City (Millions)
Manchester Metrolink Phase 1	1992	31.2	227	7.3	1.75
Sheffield Supertram	1994	29.1	361	12.4	0.7
Midland Metro	1999	21.1	191	9.1	2.3
Croydon Tramlink	2000	28.2	260	9.2	NA
Manchester Metrolink Phase 2	2000	8.0	208	25.9	1.75
Sunderland extension to Tyne & Wear Metro	2002	18.7	121	6.5	0.8
Nottingham Express Transit	2004	14.3	210	14.7	0.6
Tyne and Wear Metro	1980-84	59.1	727	12.3	0.8
Docklands Light Railway	1987	13.0	162	12.4	NA
Docklands Light Railway (Beckton extension)	1994	8.0	387	48.1	NA
Average		**23.1**	**285.4**	**12.4**	**NA**

Table 1: Light Rail Capital Construction Costs, source DfT.

4.8 What is clear is that light rail systems are very expensive and on average the in the UK have cost around £285.4 million to construct, or £12.4 million per kilometre. The costs vary significantly and will depend mainly on the nature of the route alignments and the type of system constructed. Systems with a greater amount of street running and completely new routes tend to be more expensive, whilst it is less expensive to build on disused railway lines avoiding construction works. The high costs have meant that in practice, even where passenger forecasts may justify its consideration, light rail has often not been seen as an affordable option for local transport authorities to pursue.

Operating Costs of Light Rail

4.9 There are several reasons why it would cost more to operate light rail vehicles versus buses. First and foremost there is the cost of maintaining the track and associated switches and signalling. Second, there is the cost of maintaining the tram stops and revenue costs such as employing ticket collectors, security, and maintenance workers.

4.10 From this perspective the level of patronage is not only important in justifying the construction costs but also the continuing operating costs of the system. Overall, it is more expensive to operate a light rail vehicle than a bus. Because of this fact, cost-effective use of light rail requires a large passenger demand - a demand that only exists in a few cities. However, if passenger volumes are high enough, the total costs of a light rail system can be lower than those of an equivalent bus system.

4.11 Even where there is predicted demand for a tram system the patronage, and hence revenue, has not always materialised. **Table 2** provides examples of the patronage on four systems in the UK.

System	Expected Annual Patronage	Patronage in 2010-11	% difference
Manchester Metrolink Phase 1 & 2	18	19.2	7% excess
Sheffield Supertram	22	15.0	32% shortfall
Midland Metro	8	4.8	40% shortfall
Croydon Tramlink	25	27.9	12% excess

Table 2: Expected and Actual Light Rail Patronage, Source DfT.

4.12 The Interfleet report identifies that the point that a light rail system becomes more cost effective than a conventional bus system is when demand reaches 2500 passenger places per hour per kilometre. The Atkins report suggests a demand of around 2000 passengers per direction per hour.

Patronage Demand

4.13 Public transport patronage demand is complex and difficult to predict. It is affected by a range of factors such as trip purpose, population density, fares, journey time, wait and walk times, frequency of services, comfort, safety and reliability. In addition, peoples' destinations cannot always be provided for by fixed public transport routes and other modes of transport provide a more convenient and cost effective choice. As such, demand is greatly influenced by the location and density of residential areas to other land uses such as employment, retail, leisure, health and education. If we think about Derby in this context these land uses or major trip attractors are not necessarily in the centre of Derby. In many cases being able to access these locations by public transport requires a trip into the city centre and trip out.

4.14 **Table 3** summarises the current public transport patronage demand in Derby during the AM and PM commuter peaks. This ranges from around 900 passengers per hour on the London Road corridor in both directions, to 100 passengers on the A61 corridor. In order to achieve the patronage demand to support a tram system on Derby's highest bus patronage corridor means increasing the current demand by 4.5 times the current bus patronage levels.

Corridor	Daily Patronage	Average Peak Patronage
Osmaston Road	4686	515
Uttoxeter New Road	4954	545
London Road	8294	912
Burton Road	1522	167
A61	910	100
A52 Nottingham Road	3533	389
A52 Ashbourne Road	3014	332
Duffield Road	5664	623
Kedleston Road	2876	316
Stenson Road	2440	268
Sinfin Lane	2614	287

Table 3: Bus Patronage on Derby Transport Corridors

4.15 Most patronage demand for a tram system is expected to come from existing bus services and from people transferring from their car. As a broad indication on Derby's main transport corridors the patronage demand has been calculated from the bus patronage information and observed traffic data. The Commission for integrated Transport found that a mode shift of between 12.5% and 20% can be achieved from cars, particular where park and rides are integrated into the system, and 48% to 69% from other public transport. **Table 4** sets out the calculation and shows that at this broad level it is estimated that for London Road the peak weekday patronage demand is around 950 people. This is only slightly more than the current bus patronage demand on the corridor.

Transport Corridor	Weekday Peak Traffic Flow		Peak Bus Patronage	Total Mode Shift		Peak Weekday Patronage Demand	
	AM	PM		20% Car	69%	AM	PM

				Occupants***		from Buses in Peak		
				AM	PM			
A6 London Road	1387	1486	912	300	321	629	929	950
A514 Osmaston Road	1101	1000	515	238	216	355	593	571
A61 Sir Frank Whittle	1929	1990	100	417	430	69	486	499
A52 East	1674	1731	389	362	374	268	630	642
A6 Duffield Road	1481	1437	623	320	310	430	750	740
A516 Uttoxeter New Rd	1753	2040	545	379	441	376	755	817
A5250 Burton Road	1238	1406	167	267	304	115	383	419

Note*** Assumed that 90% of traffic flow are cars with 1.2 peak hour occupancy

Table 4: Broad Estimated Patronage Demand for a Tram System on Derby's Main Transport Corridors

Affordability

4.16 Most major local infrastructure schemes in the UK are funded through Central Governments' Local Major Transport Schemes capital pot. This has supported major infrastructure projects such as Connecting Derby, Integrated Ring Road Maintenance Scheme (IRRIMS) and more recently London Road Bridge Replacement. The Government expects a local contribution from authorities to show their commitment to the transport priorities that they put forward. For light rail schemes the Government in the past has set a minimum local contribution of 25%.

4.17 The Department for Transport has a very specific objective in its business plan to support sustainable local travel by investing in local transport, decentralising funding and powers, tackling local congestion and making public transport, walking and cycling more attractive. The emphasis is very much on smaller local schemes that support economic growth. As a consequence, they are decentralising the decision making on local major schemes to the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) through the creation of Local Transport Bodies (LTB) on a population basis. It is estimated that D2N2, which is the Derby/Nottingham LEP, will receive around £42 million over the next spending period. This means that on a population basis that Derby's share will be around £6.2 million.

4.18 In order to take forward a tram system Derby City Council would have to spend around 10% on the design and transport economic business case. The designs costs are fees not considered part of the construction costs and include scheme and traffic management, design, public consultation, public inquiry, gaining statutory powers or other licences and consents, the cost of any surveys and contract and procurement. In the development of the Leeds Supertram scheme, which was axed in 2005, the local authority and metro had spent £40 million on the development of the scheme.

4.19 With the devolvement of the Local Major Transport capital pot to LTBs there is less certainty over the future Major Scheme Funding and how large infrastructure projects will be funded in future. In reality, new tram systems such as the Nottingham Express Transit have never been fully funded by government because of their large scale capital cost and risk in terms of both construction and operation, in particular patronage demand meeting revenue forecasts. The £210 million NET Phase 1 project funding was met from bank loans, sponsor equity and Government

grant.

4.20 The DfT is currently looking at why trams cost so much to deliver [1] in the UK and mechanisms for funding them. However, they want to move away from over-reliance of promoters on Central Government to fund light rail. They are suggesting proposals for Tax Increment Financing (TIF) to enable councils to pay for large infrastructure schemes. A local authority, private sector partner or some combination will be able to raise money upfront to pay for infrastructure, on the basis that the increased business rate revenues generated by the scheme can be used to repay that initial investment. The upfront funding may be borrowed from public or private sources, or it may be provided by the developer from capital available to it. This would place all financial risk with either private investors or local authorities.

Public Petitions for Trams and Trolleybuses

Tram Proposal – In particular Between Mickleover and Mackworth

4.21 Mr Gibson wrote to the Council over a number of weeks between June and December 2012, initially outlining proposals for a tram line between Mickleover, Derby City Centre and Pride Park. **Figure 1** below illustrates the proposed 14 kilometre alignment, which was cost at £100 million. This compares to using average UK construction costs of £12.4 million per kilometre, which for 14 kilometres of tramway would come to around £174 million. Later proposals included a wider network of over 50 kilometres of tramways across Derby.



Figure 1: Mickleover/Mackwork to Pride Park Proposed Tram Route.

4.22 Mr Gibson's proposal and costs were based on very broad 'desk top' estimations. Mr Gibson believes that the track system can be delivered considerably cheaper than the current construction standards used in the UK, by reducing the standard of the track foundations. This does not require the relocation of utilities, which is a significant part of the construction cost. In addition, Mr Gibson is involved in designing a lighter tram vehicle that he believes will allow for the reduced track

[1] Green Light for Trams, September 2011

standards to be adopted in Derby. Indeed, Mr Gibson is looking to develop a 1 kilometre test track on the alignment of the Great Northern line to showcase track construction and new tram vehicle.

4.23 The costs calculated by Mr Gibson are not based on any detailed design or detailed understanding of ground conditions, topography, structures, traffic management or land ownership on the proposed tram alignment. For example, the Mickleover Mackworth Express Busway study, mentioned in Paragraph 4.4 of this report, identified that the Great Northern Rail alignment has a number of expensive civil engineering issues that need to be resolved. Although the Mickleover/Mackworth Busway utilises a former heavy rail alignment, a large proportion of the track bed of the existing railway to the west of the A38 is buried under infill, some of it contaminated, and is basically no more than a drainage ditch today. Indeed, to reinstate the track bed would require the removal of the infill and significant engineering works. In addition, there are also structures and rights of way that cross the alignment that would need to be reinstated or new structures constructed. One of the structures that is likely to have be replaced, and wasn't costed in the Halcrow study, is the Uttoxeter Old Road bridge These engineering costs were not considered in Mr Gibson's costs.

4.24 Notwithstanding these points, a £100 million is still a significant amount of money for an infrastructure project, particularly when Central Government is looking to reduce the over-reliance of promoters on Central Government to fund light rail schemes. In addition, and as broadly outlined in Paragraphs 4.13-4.15 of this report, there is a big question over the level of demand in Derby for a tram system. Even with a significant reduction in construction costs the operational costs would not necessarily be reduced. As such, any capital borrowing and operation and maintenance costs would have to be met by the revenue returned from the patronage on the system. For Derby this would mean increasing public transport patronage from existing levels by at least 4.5 times.

4.25 Part of Mr Gibson's argument for a tram system in Derby is that other cities in Europe that are of a similar size to Derby have tram systems, in particular Angers and Brest in France. These systems are around 12 km and 14 km in length and cost around £300 million and £250 million respectively. The capital costs of these systems are still very large and French systems do not place the same level of forecast patronage demand on systems as the UK. This is in part linked to the way that the systems are funded and reduced reliance on borrowing, which demands a minimum patronage level to secure a level of revenue return to cover the costs of the system.

4.26 Indeed, in France the majority of recent tramway projects have been funded through the versement transport (transport tax, in English), or VT for short. The VT was introduced by the federal government in 1982 as a way of directly funding public transport projects. The level of funding that the VT generates per annum is substantial and as an example, Bordeaux with a population of 720,000 generates around £68 million per annum. The VT has removed the uncertainty linked to funding capital investments and has provided a guaranteed 'income' to first build and then operate the tramway.

4.27 Nevertheless the French tram systems do attract high patronage. Studies have linked this to the density of population in French urban centres. For example, of the cities with trams in France compared to those in the UK, the population catchment densities are around 5200 per kilometre compared to 600 per kilometre^2. In the UK trams are constructed to link lower-density suburbs with urban centres, where they are intended to attract motorists from their cars for journeys to work. The comfort of relatively assured patronage from dense catchment areas is not experienced in the UK. As such, patronage is always a risk.

Derby T-Bus Proposal – Mackworth, City Centre to Sinfin

4.28 Mr Moore wrote to Officers in November 2011 and subsequently February 2012 submitting draft and final versions of a considered report proposing a 14.8 kilometre network for a trolleybus from Mackworth via the City Centre, to Allenton, Chellaston Business Park and Sinfin. The proposals include a park and ride facility adjacent to the Mackworth terminus. **Figure 2** below provides a summary of the routes proposed by Mr Moore, which includes around 6.0 kilometres of new track.

[2] Comparative Performance Data From French Tramways Systems, SYPTE, 2003



Figure 2: Mackworth, City Centre to Sinfin Proposed Trolleybus Route

4.29 The Department for Transport provisionally awarded £173.5 million to Metro and Leeds City Council in July 2012 to construct a £250.7 million trolleybus system. The remaining £77.2 million for the Leeds New Generation Transport (NGT) system is being funded by the local authorities from developer contributions and capital reserves. The scheme is the first modern non heritage trolleybus system in the UK since the closure of the Bradford system in 1972. Construction on the 14.3 kilometre scheme is expected to start in 2016 and be operational by 2018. The trolleybuses will have the visual appearance of a tram, will be steered by overhead cables and will use 6.1 kilometres of new segregated track to minimise congestion and improve journey times. The cost of the vehicles is around £700,000 each and the total average cost per kilometre for the system is £17.5 million. The scheme also comprises of two major new park and ride sites at either end of the route that are 800 spaces and 1500 spaces in size.

4.30 It seems that the costs of the Leeds NGT trolleybus system are more than the average cost per kilometre of light rail systems in the UK. However, the costs of the axed Leeds Supertram were around £36 million per kilometre. It is likely that the costs of the system are being driven by the level of segregated route that is required

to give the trolleybus system any step change in journey time reliability. In addition, the system is still trying to emulate a tram system by including high quality vehicles and stops. Again probably to make the tangible jump from a conventional bus system to mass rapid transit.

4.31 Mr Moore has undertaken a desk top study of the proposed T-Bus Derby route and costs. He estimates that the 14.8 kilometre network will cost between 60 and 100 million to construct with operating costs of around £1.0 million per annum. Interestingly the annual operation costs for the Leeds trolleybus system is £9.1 million per annum.

4.32 The proposal is substantially cheaper per kilometre than average tram construction costs and the Leeds NGT scheme. However, these are not detailed costs and Mr Moore identifies that they are based on pro-rata costs taken from other desk top studies. Indeed the Leeds trolleybus scheme, which is similar in route length to the Derby proposal and includes two park and rides, has been through detailed design and rigorous economic transport appraisal.

4.33 Notwithstanding this the construction costs estimated by for the 'T Bus' proposal are still substantial and, for the reason outlined in Paragraph 4.16-4.20 of this report, the City Council would find difficult to afford. This is without considering the patronage demand for the system or benefits that a trolleybus system would provide over a conventional diesel bus system. Some of the main benefits are:

- Trolleybuses offer quiet operation,
- Zero on-street emissions, improved route reliability through segregated routes and prioritisation over road traffic,
- Freedom from complete dependence on oil. Trolleybuses are especially favoured where electricity is abundant and cheap.
- They also have excellent operational characteristics such as quick acceleration and ability to carry heavy loads, so they perform well on busy routes.
- The Leeds NGT will operate with articulated vehicles that can carry 100-160 passengers. This is a major benefit for Leeds where the proposed NGT route currently experiences overcrowding on existing buses and bunching in traffic congestion.

4.34 However, there are also limitations with trolleybuses:

- They require overhead wires that can be intrusive, particularly in historical and residential areas.
- The additional infrastructure such as overhead wires, substations and segregated routes require additional maintenance.
- In order to provide any gains in journey time benefits over cars there needs to be high levels of segregated routes, which increase the cost of construction and require land take.

- It is often not possible to provide on-road routes without taking capacity away from general traffic. One of the predicted dis-benefits of the Leeds NGT system is that the infrastructure removes capacity along the corridors, also banning turns and restricting general highway movements at some locations.

- One of the major benefits of trolleybuses is zero emissions. However, with improvements in technology for conventional buses, such as low emission engines and potential dual electric/diesel engines, this gap is being reduced. For example, Hybrid electric buses produce around 40% less carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions than traditional diesel engined buses. These types of buses are already operating on Derby's bus network.

- They require a significant increase in patronage to justify the jump in operation and maintenance costs.

4.35 For the Derby T-Bus proposal a considered estimate of the potential patronage demand for the route and catchment was provided. This was based on logical but broad assumptions about where the population demand could be generated from and the likely origin and destination of trips. For example, it was assumed that people within a 900 metre catchment of the T-Bus route, travelling less than 10 kilometres would potentially use the route.

4.36 The Derby T-Bus report provided a high, medium and low estimate for the system, which were around 3000, 2000 and 1000 passengers during the weekday AM and PM commuter peak. The T-Bus report suggests that the medium scenario is the more likely patronage demand.

4.37 However, at this level it is straightforward to produce optimistic patronage forecasts, as explained in Paragraphs 4.13 of this report. The lower patronage estimate is similar to the current cumulative bus patronage levels on the Uttoxeter, Sinfin and Osmaston Road corridors (see Table 4). It was assumed that for the T_Bus medium scenario that 15% of patronage would transfer from existing bus services, 16% would be new trips and 69% would transfer from car.

4.38 There is little evidence on the minimum demand levels required in the UK to underpin a trolleybus system, however, the Leeds NGT system is forecasting patronage of around 3500 passengers during the weekday AM and PM commuter peaks.

Demand Source	AM Peak	AM Peak %
Total NGT Demand	**3,308**	**100%**
Transfer from bus	2,417	73%
Transfer from car	206	6%
Park & Ride Transfer	504	15%
Active modes	181	5%

Table 5: Leeds NGT Annual Demand Forecasts 2031 (millions)

4.39 A major objective with the Leeds NGT system is that it is providing for existing patronage where the existing conventional bus network cannot cope with the demand. As such, a step change in public transport is needed to supply the demand and improve journey time reliability. As such, 73% of the patronage for the Leeds NGT will transfer from existing bus users and 21% from car or park and ride. This is a significant different set of mode transfer assumptions to the T-Bus proposal. Indeed, the current bus demand on the Uttoxeter, Sinfin and Osmaston Road corridors would not generate anywhere near the level of transfer from bus forecast for the Leeds NGT system.

Conclusions

4.40 The costs of both trams and trolleybuses are of a level that currently makes investment in these systems unaffordable for Derby. The DfT is currently reviewing barriers to delivering light rail schemes including looking at reducing the costs of dealing with utilities and standardising track and vehicle systems, which the DfT feel tend to be over designed. However, even if current UK construction costs are halved the initial capital investment costs and on-going operation and maintenance costs would still be significant.

4.41 It is difficult to predict patronage forecasts without detailed appraisal and transport modelling demand forecasting. However, existing public transport demand and the potential mode transfer from car suggests that there is not the passenger demand to underpin the jump in both construction and operating costs for either a trolleybus or tram system in Derby.

4.42 An important issue to consider is that in order to maximise patronage capture for a tram or trolleybus system, it would require a much wider transport planning strategy to deliver. A new mass public transit would invariably compete with the bus network and this would have to be reorganised. The private car will be the major competitor to a tram network and would need to be restricted to ensure maximum patronage transfer. Indeed, Nottingham has introduced a work place parking levy to discourage commuter car trips and to help pay for their public transport system. Demand management, such as work place parking levies and congestion charging, is not part of the current long term transport strategy for Derby City.

4.43 The last point to make is that it is there is a strong logical argument that a reliable and fast mass public transit system is critical to maintaining the future vitality of the city and in providing equitable travel choices for its residents and visitors. Various types of high-quality public transport, as an alternative to conventional buses, have been considered in the development of the Local Transport Plan in past. Transport options will continued to be reviewed as public transport systems and new technology are developed and costs change.

OTHER OPTIONS CONSIDERED

5.1 None

This report has been approved by the following officers:

Legal officer	N/A

Financial officer **Human Resources officer** **Service Director(s)** **Other(s)**	 N/A N/A

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Background papers:	None
List of appendices:	Appendix 1 – Implications

Appendix 1

IMPLICATIONS

Financial and Value for Money

1.1 None arising from this report

Legal

2.1 Article 6.4 of the Constitution enables Overview and Scrutiny Boards to assist the Council and the Council Cabinet in the development of its budget and policy framework by in-depth analysis of policy issues.

Personnel

3.1 None arising from this report

Equalities Impact

4.1 None arising from this report

Health and Safety

5.1 None arising from this report

Environmental Sustainability

6.1 None arising from this report

Asset Management

7.1 None arising from this report

Risk Management

8.1 None arising from this report

Corporate objectives and priorities for change

9.1 None arising from this report